The Woes of PDVSA Debt Holders
Mark Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati
Many things about the current situation in Venezuela bewilder us. Among them are parts of the new sanctions. The one that especially puzzles us is the part that says that transfers of PDVSA debt claims by US persons are only permitted to non-U.S. persons.
What could possibly be the logic here? To attempt to see that, our first question was: What is the likely effect of such a constraint. Answer: To kill the liquidity of the bonds and promissory notes and any other debt instruments, since US investors are likely 50% or more of this market. And that in turn means that the price of these PDVSA instruments is going to drop precipitously.
But why hurt the market for PDVSA debt instruments so viciously? Maybe the UST knows that there are large chunks of these instruments held by Maduro cronies who have been issuing these instruments to themselves (without paying fully for them) so that they have a nest egg in the event of a change in government. But does that help get rid of Maduro and his cronies faster? Not clear. But maybe there is a story here. We'd love to know more.
Alternatively, and this is a bleaker story for the PDVSA holders, maybe the Trump administration knows that a future restructuring of Venezuelan debt under the new government is going to have to be particularly brutal. And maybe they want to make sure that US holders have largely sold off their holdings to non US entities? Maybe. But if this is the case, then why are similar sale restrictions not being imposed on the bonds of the Republic?
Or maybe this bit of the new sanctions is just an error. Maybe.
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