Why on earth we would continue to extend programs intended to protect banks and hence their depositors to any entity that substantially engages in issuing and dealing in securities?
UBS CEO Oswald Grübel reacted to the bank's "rogue" trader scandal in the same way as another European former bank chairman did when faced with a similar scandal a few years ago: Defiantly.
There was widespread speculation the U.K.'s Independent Commission on Banking would create at large market for contingent capital securities. But its recently released final version of the Vicker's report does no such thing.
The total notional value of credit-default swaps has reached almost $30 trillion. I doubt there has ever been an industry or product line that expanded so fast or got so big without attracting serious scrutiny.
Global custodians have spent decades using bundled fees to mask egregious conflicts of interest and overcharge pension funds, and by extension the taxpayers and public servants who underwrite them.
Andrew Kahr's "Systemic Risk Is About Assets, Not Size" rightly focuses on bubble-inflating movements in the aggregate balance sheet of the financial sector. We should expand on three of his points.
Why so much focus on resolution rather than encouraging, or requiring, the systemically important financial institutions to develop proper plans for crisis recovery?
